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"THE FUTURE OF LAW" DEBATE: GREENEBAUM ON
SUSSKIND AND SUSSKIND'S REPLY
Is the medium the message? A discussion
of Susskind's The Future of Law
EDWIN H. GREENEBAUM
Faculty of Law, Indiana University, USA
I first read The Future of Law' in June, 1998, acquainting myself with Richard
Susskind's analysis of the implications of the continuing revolution in information
technology for the development of law and legal practice. I had been in England
during March and April continuing research on the evolution of training programs
in commercial law firms.2 Several of my informants, who I had not interviewed in
person since 1994, told me about Professor Susskind's book, wondering about the
significance of his analyses for the law firms whose futures they were participating in
molding.' As I read the volume, I mused on whether Susskind's predictions of an
information technology (IT) driven paradigmatic change in the nature of legal
practice would prove true in the marketplace of information, law, and commerce.
With publication of the Lord Chancellor's Department's consultation paper, Civil
Justice: Resolving and Avoiding Disputes in the Information Age (Civil Justice),4 in
September, 1998, evidently influenced by Professor Susskind's work,s I became
aware that change might, to a degree, be driven by governmental policy, not just the
result of market choices. Thus, it becomes a pressing task to examine Professor
Susskind's premises and the argument he builds on them.'
In focusing on Susskind's argument supporting his prediction of a new
paradigm of legal practice, I should note that I will neglect considerable valuable
material that he develops along the way regarding IT and its current and possible
uses in legal practice and the justice system. The Future of Law works on several
levels, as a primer and guide for the unfamiliar,' as a stimulant for new uses of IT
in legal practice,' and as an exhortation to the benighted. The question of a new
paradigm of legal practice aside, the manner in which we undertake our tasks, the
efficiency with which we work, and how we communicate and transact business
among ourselves, with our clients, and with courts and other agencies are being, and
will continue to be, affected dramatically by IT developments. Dramatic changes in
our environment, such as the IT revolution, challenge our habits of thought and will
stimulate some to imagine new possibilities. How lawyers, in firms and as a
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profession, respond to IT developments will certainly affect their competitive pos-
ition. Susskind's text is well worth reading by all of us who should be interested in
these matters whether or not one is persuaded by its most dramatic predictions.
Before undertaking the task I do assume here, I should disclose somewhat more
the point from which I view Professor Susskind's project. As an American academic,
I began my study of training programs in English law firms as a tool in firms'
organizational development in 1990. By that time, while the World Wide Web was
not yet a part of our scene, I and my colleagues had been communicating by e-mail
within our building and around the world, Lexis and Westlaw (and other on-line
data bases) were established research vehicles, and computer programs for many
aspects of business management were widely available. Accordingly, I was surprised
to find many of the commercial law firms participating in my study to have been
slow to adopt information technology. In my 1991 working paper, I wrote:
Many firms state in their marketing brochures that they utilize state-of-the-
art information technology, but for some this is limited to word processing,
fax, and photocopier. Many go no further than a Lexis terminal in their
otherwise conventional libraries and some not that far. A few are develop-
ing databases of their own or are exploring litigation support and "expert
systems".
Even in 1994, few of my informants could communicate with me by e-mail, and
there was at least as much pain as profit in firms' steps and missteps in IT
investment. In more than one firm in my study, the adoption of new IT systems and
employment of IT management were experienced as significant degradations of
work experience. By spring, 1998, much had changed. I could arrange my interviews
by e-mail; those appointments were recorded in my informant's electronic diaries;
training schedules and materials were managed on firm's IT systems; the brochures
and newsletters that one found in racks in firms' waiting rooms were also appearing
on the web pages of several firms. I was told that on-line data bases and CD-ROMs
were decreasing reliance on printed materials in these firms' libraries, as they have
for us in academia. These and numerous other experiences evidenced the
significant, and much more successful, investments firms had made in IT infrastruc-
ture (hardware, software, and personnel)." By this time, IT has infiltrated the
systems through which we all accomplish our work in extensive and irreversible
ways. I have no doubt that other developments, such as intranets and conferencing
software, will be well used by the law firms in my study. With this rapid change in
IT facilities, however, I have seen little evidence that the conception of law practice
that informs work in my firms has changed in any fundamental way. Whether these
lawyers are in "denial" of a future, inexorable paradigmatic change," as Professor
Susskind argues, or, alternatively, the knowledge-in-action" evidenced in these
practices is based profoundly in the nature of law is the question this essay attempts
to address.
First, I will summarize Professor Susskind's arguments. I will then examine
some questionable premises from which Susskind reasons. While I have some
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doubts about some of Susskind's argument on a technical level, my arguments, more
deeply, will be that The Future of Law does not account adequately for how lawyers
add value to transactions or appreciate the genius with which "common law"
jurisprudence manages change. In my view, the state of IT constrains legal practice,
but is not central to its nature. It will follow from this argument that there may be
more serious social costs from the changes which Susskind forecasts, and which
government policy might encourage, than Susskind's argument appreciates. Pro-
fessor Susskind's insights, and the experiences in which they are based, cannot be
easily dismissed. Change there will be, and the changing IT environment will be a
significant factor. I will conclude, however, that changes in legal practice occurring as
a function of IT development are not paradigmatic.
Do-it-yourself law
The past, present, and future of IT in legal practice, as told by Susskind, is
movement from the "backroom" (business management infrastructure, such as
accounts, and secretarial support), "to lawyers' desks" (providing facilitative tech-
nology for lawyers' work), "to clients' desks" (making legal information available to
clients without lawyer mediation)." It is the new relations between lawyers and
clients resulting from this shift that will constitute the new paradigm of legal
practice. That is, the continuing revolution in IT will make law accessible to laymen,
and lawyers will become predominately information engineers and providers rather
than counselors. As I was reading The Future of Law, I repeatedly said to myself,
"This is about do-it-yourself law".14
Richard Susskind is especially well qualified to recount this history, and while
I have doubts about his forecast, his interdisciplinary vantage point is unusual,
perhaps unique. He has a degree in law and a doctorate in law and computers. He
worked in a substantial accountancy firm (Ernst & Young, 1986-89) and firm of
solicitors engaged in international commercial practice (Masons, 1989-97).
Susskind has been Visiting Professor to the Centre for Law, Computers and
Technology, Strathclyde University since 1990 and IT Advisor to the Lord Chief
Justice of England since 1998. His continuing independent consultancy on the uses
of technology has included work with some of the world's largest professional firms,
with government departments, and with the courts.
Development in IT is central to Susskind's story. Storage in electronic form,
technology of retrieval, and electronic accessibility are the key elements in making
legal materials available to anyone with computer and access to the Internet. IT will
make the full promulgation of legal authority possible, diminishing the role of
lawyers in mediating the communication of law to laymen. The weak links at the
current time are "excessive quantity and complexity of legal material"
("hyperregulation")" and limits in the models of searching logic on which retrieval
technology is now based. The former screens laymen from access to legal materials.
The latter is too indiscriminate in the texts it retrieves, deluging the researcher with
too much irrelevant material. The fulcrum to leveraging the new paradigm will be
the invention of improved searching models by which IT systems will "bring to users
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all but only the material relevant for their particular purposes"."s Susskind is
confident this "technology lag" will be overcome, moving IT from data processing
to true information management." In this context, market forces and democratic
principles will produce legal texts articulated in terms laymen can understand. In the
circumstances, lawyers will advise clients less, and clients will, instead, insist on the
provision of the information on which they can make their own decisions. Lawyers
will either adjust to this new paradigm or become obsolete since publishers, among
others, will be all too ready to fill the void. Susskind predicts that there will continue
to be some law practiced in the current model, but even here clients will insist on
access to the legal materials and work product on which advice is based, and
communication and information technology will permit more fluid boundaries
between firms and their clients. The bulk of the profession, Susskind argues, will
simply not be able to do business as usual. The silver lining to this cloudy story is
that lawyers should be well positioned to provide the information services of the new
order, if they should avail themselves of the opportunity, and the efficiency of the
new paradigm should bring to life a "latent legal market" of individuals and
businesses that cannot now afford legal services. In his introduction to the 1998
edition, Susskind argues the future legal market will be segmented three ways:
"traditional", in which lawyers will serve clients in the familiar relationship;
"commoditized", in which routine legal matters will be serviced by paralegals heavily
supported by IT; and the new "latent legal market", in which customers will benefit
from legal information services. 20
"... all, but only ... "
"All but only" is something of a mantra in Susskind's texts (always in italics). When
the "technology lag" is overcome and "all but only" the relevant (understandable)
information will be retrieved in response to questions put in plain language, the law
will be at everyone's fingertips. 2 1 Because law will be so readily available and
applicable, individuals and businesses will increasingly use legal information to
prevent loss rather than to clean up avoidable messes. To understand why this may
be a false vision, we need to reflect on concepts of relevance, problems of infor-
mation quantity and quality, and the relationship between law, language, and
change.
The word "relevant" is ubiquitous in this text, but nowhere is its meaning
explored, or defined for purposes of the argument. Neither is "purpose". I will not
do much better here, since these words represent central issues in epistemology and
jurisprudence, but I will make a few points to show that more than a "technology
lag" stands between laymen and access to "all, but only" the relevant legal
"information", itself a concept of some doubt.22 To start with, our purposes are
shaped, in part, by the kind of information we expect to find, and the information
we do find frequently leads us to reshape our purposes. So our information has to
be relevant to a moving target. Relevance is as much a matter of imagination as it
is of logic. The contextual world in which we perceive the premises from which we
reason is one we create and re-create in our minds. The perceptions of analogy from
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which we reason are also acts of creativity. Even in logic, information may be more
immediate or distant, more central or peripheral in its impact on the matter that
concerns us. Where information becomes too tangential to be considered "relevant"
is a question of judgment rather than logic.
Further, I do not want all relevant information. I want information that is of
sufficient quality and cogency. Too much of the relevant information I retrieve in my
research is not worth having. The quality problem may be inadequate research,
reasoning, or articulation. It may also be a matter of obsolescence, since.legal work
seeks to predict and control future social and economic behavior. My legal training
enables me to make judgments regarding the quality and cogency of the information
I retrieve. (That is only one of the ways in which lawyers add value, of which more
later.) Laymen are disadvantaged in this regard, and I have not seen it argued that
artificial intelligence will be able to make these kinds of judgments about infor-
mation in the foreseeable future, if ever. Indeed, IT itself makes the storage of
information cheap, and I am concerned that bad information will be a currency that
drives out the good.23
It is important in these issues to consider how the law and lawyers use language.
"Rules of law" are conceptions which influence decisions of lawyers in their various
roles, but which are indeterminate, having shifting meanings in different contexts.
Legal rules are understood differently by different lawyers, which is itself a part of
the reality of these "rules". Adding further difficulty for laymen, legal content must
be inferred from a literature which has to be understood as a product of the
processes which produced it. For example, the meaning of language in a court
opinion is different depending on whether the judges are speaking in a context of
permitting an action to be commenced, determining the proper instructions to a
jury, foreclosing decision of a case by a jury by directing a verdict, awarding a new
trial, or admitting or excluding evidence. In each instance what facts are assumed to
be true and what turns on the result will differ.
Many legal concepts are intellectual constructs representing phenomena that do
not exist in nature. Consider, for example, the conceptions of property and transac-
tions that are taxable events. VAT lawyers test and re-create the boundaries of such
concepts. They must understand, as well, how the legal concepts with which they
work may be markers for the intersection of substance and process, (for example, the
fluid boundary between "fact" and "law") and for unresolved issues (delegation to
the future). The-concepts that guide legal w6rk are classifications imposed upon
events. "Proximate cause" and "cause of action" are not unreal, but they are a
reality-in-the-mind, important because they aid understanding and because they are
"realities" upon which other professionals act as well. Thus, law, like every pro-
fessional discipline, has its strange realities, and legal education and experience lead
one to see events and circumstances in new ways. Lawyers do, no doubt and
regrettably, use professional "jargon" as signals by which they identify each other,
mystify the uninitiated, and maintain control at the expense of clients. But legal
information is a specialized organization of common sense that requires translation.
Lawyers can, and in my view should, help their clients understand the significance
of legal information for their particular situations. Nevertheless, the subtleties are
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real, and laymen on their own will be disadvantaged.24 Policy that would reduce the
provision of professional legal services in favor of DIY should address the question
of the extent to which this can be safely done.25
For Susskind, the law seems to be predominately static and predictable.
Uncertainty there is, perceived as "gaps in the law", prompting "a minor philosoph-
ical [jurisprudential] digression" explaining why there will continue to be some
scope for traditional lawyering, but this, apparently, is not the norm. In my view,
while there are circumstances in which static and predictable law applied to a static
and predictable world is an appropriate assumption,27 this is an inadequate account-
ing for law as the complex social institution it is.
Susskind apparently assumes that behavior follows the law, or at least will do so
when law is adequately promulgated. But law follows behavior at least as much as
the other way around. It is not just limitations of existing IT that prompt us to
conduct our lives without close attention to the law. The genius of common law
jurisprudence, in my view, is its ability to renegotiate principles of public order,
guided by evolving community perceptions and standards, as the current order is
challenged by cases arising from changing environments.2 8 Common law legislatures
sometimes enact terms not susceptible to "interpretation", but frequently legislate in
less controlling ways, changing the direction of the law or loosening the too
constricting terms in which doctrinal development has become trapped, but leaving
it to the courts to work out the details. This jurisprudence allows for a dynamic
response to changing economic and political circumstances that may contribute
substantially to the success of British and American legal institutions in competition
with institutions embedded in civil law. Susskind's prediction that legal work will be
done more in advance, based on general principles rather than on case by case
advice, suggests a movement away from common to civil law codes and culture.
Whether that would meet the needs of legal markets in a changing world, or would
be desirable, is not clear to me. 3 0
How lawyers and law firms add value
Susskind does not directly state a model of how lawyers add value to clients'
transactions. In the traditional paradigm of legal practice, as Susskind states it,
lawyers advise clients reactively one-on-one," but in the new paradigm this kind of
advice will be needed only "on those occasions where the language of a system is
indeterminate, or there is an absence of relevant information, or there is a conflict
in the information or there is a realistic prospect of some exception being implied".3 2
From this we may infer that in Susskind's model, lawyers add value by distilling the
legal information necessary to guide clients from the "hyperregulation" that consti-
tutes today's legal sources and by advising and representing clients where their
matters involve legal uncertainties. While lawyers do add value in these ways, this is
an inadequate accounting of the matter. It can help us to answer this question by
surveying reasons why some senior lawyers command higher fees than junior ones.33
I take this approach on the premise that inexperienced DIYers, even with infor-
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mation and aptitude, are unlikely to be able to add value for themselves beyond that
created by inexperienced lawyers.
Wheat from the chaff. Even if lawyers add as much value at the outset of their
careers as they do later, one cannot know which lawyers offer best value until they
develop a track record and reputation. How quickly it takes better lawyers to
distinguish themselves depends on their opportunities to demonstrate their value.
(Similarly, inexperienced laymen will not be in a position to judge their aptitudes for
DIY law.)
Knowhow: increased efficiency. With any task, the inexperienced will incur greater
costs in setting up for the particular job and incur a greater error rate. The narrower
the lawyer's specialty, the greater the efficiencies that may be gained with experi-
ence. But there are diminishing returns in increased efficiency as one practices the
same specialty over time. Lawyers' ability to continue to increase their efficiency in
these terms, after their relatively early years, may depend on their interest and
aptitude for multiplying their work in supervision of others and in adopting new
technologies of the kinds explored in The Future of Law.
Diversity of experience. Clients have only the benefit of the experience arising from
their own, to some degree unique, situations. Experienced lawyers in independent
practices approach a particular client's situation from the perspective of seeing
related issues arise in many contexts. This depth and breadth of experience contin-
ues to increase throughout careers and is particularly valuable in judging the
implications of changing environments.
Transaction knowhow: increasing benefits, reducing costs, creation of persuasive strate-
gies. Lawyers create value, as transaction engineers, by helping parties obtain
greater benefits from negotiation." Parties benefit from negotiations by distributive
outcomes, by integrative outcomes, by increasing the resources available to them,
and by exploiting the relationships between their interests. The idea of distributive
outcomes relates to those aspects of bargaining situations where there is a fixed,
often monetary, resource available to the parties, and they must divide that resource
between them. In this context, one party benefits by obtaining more of that resource
at the expense of the other party. Economists view this as a losing transaction, from
a community viewpoint, because there are transaction costs in the negotiation with
no increased benefits from trade. Integrative outcomes are available in situations
where the parties have different priorities, values, or costs for different resources.
Parties trade goods of less value (priority) for others they value more highly.
Similarly, a party may be able to provide a good at a lower cost than the cost at
which the other party could obtain the equivalent good from other sources. This is
how trading maximizes value in a market.
Negotiating parties may also benefit by increasing resources available to them.
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This can happen by discovering entitlements of which they were previously unaware
or by subsidy from third parties interested in the negotiation outcome. Resources
may also be increased by testing structural constraints. Assumptions about legal
constraints on parties' opportunities may be invalid, or relationships, time, and
geography may be restructured in ways not previously conceived. Parties can also
increase the resources available for their bargaining by recognizing their psycholog-
ical and procedural, as well as their substantive interests. The satisfaction of a valued
relationship or of an apology and the assurance of an efficient and fair means for
coping with future problems are examples of goods available from negotiation in
situations where parties may otherwise think of themselves as bargaining over money
or property.
Finally, benefit may be obtained from recognizing the relationship of parties'
interests. Negotiating parties share an interest in increasing the resources available
to divide between them. A creditor's interest in repayment depends on the debtor's
business succeeding. Recognizing that the parties have corresponding interests
legitimates sharing resources. In some negotiations, truly conflicting interests may be
less significant than the parties' shared, interdependent, and corresponding interests,
if these factors are recognized.
With experience, lawyers learn to perceive the opportunities for these benefits
and to realize them at efficient cost through getting the balance right between
competitive and cooperative negotiating styles" and between positional and interest
oriented bargaining.36 Put more broadly, lawyers exercise influence in negotiation,
planning, and dispute resolution by articulating strategies (visions) on which they,
their clients, and others are persuaded to act. The capacity to create value in these
ways is the product of educated imagination. Lawyers' experience informs their
aptitude and discipline with themes on which they create variations." Interpersonal
skills are required as well to judge the audience and communicate the message.
These are not uniquely legal skills, which is why lawyers have competition from
other professions for this kind of work, but the need to create transactional value in
the context of legal structures and to conceive persuasive strategies that accommo-
date legal constraints give lawyers special opportunities. Lawyers' repertory of
themes on which they create new variations increases with experience. Those of us
with experience teaching negotiation know that these opportunities for value cre-
ation are not readily perceived by many.
Knowhow: insight and judgment. Lawyers make judgments about the intersection of
authority with social (including business) processes and institutions. How will
participants in a matter (including parties, governmental officers, and judges)
behave; how can they be influenced and facilitated to behave in beneficial ways?
What transactions costs are necessarily incurred to safely accomplish clients' goals?
How can legal issues be best managed alongside other aspects of clients' matters?
How can legal work be accomplished without causing harm? How can problems be
solved and matters negotiated to best serve clients' interests? Some lawyers more
than others acquire the matured and disciplined judgment and creativity to advise
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their clients in these ways. Only a few have more than an inkling of what is involved
in these terms at the beginning of their careers.
Independent judgment. Lawyers come to their clients' problems with independent
judgment from the beginning of their careers, but its value increases with diversity
of experience and developed knowhow."
How do law firms add value?
Law firms add value beyond the value added by individual practitioners. They
develop and supervise lawyers. They provide efficiencies by assigning lawyers to
tasks with appropriate levels of expertise (and expense). They have lawyers with
diverse expertise and aptitudes. They have the knowhow to manage risk and stand
behind their work. They develop knowhow and invest in infrastructure and sup-
port.39 Few clients have the value and variety of legal matters to make investment in
developing these capacities efficient.
Clients across the spectrum of society, with all kinds of legal problems, can
benefit from the resources and wisdom available from mature legal practices, and
overcoming the technology lag (if it is overcome in the way Susskind suggests) will
not bring this value to clients' transactions through IT. Not everyone or every firm
or institution can afford to pay lawyers and their firms (or the best lawyers and firms)
the price for adding this value, but that does not mean that legal advice would not
be useful to them in these ways.
What kind of new world?
Basically, Susskind's paradigm is not new. DIY and unlicenced legal support has
always competed with authorized practice.40
First, we conduct many "legal" transactions in our daily lives without lawyers,
and in this sense we are all DIY lawyers. For example, we ordinarily make purchases
on the high street without seeking legal advice. There are, of course, hazards in
doing so, and IT may be increasing them. When I purchase an item at long distance
using the telephone or the Internet, the contract I receive with the product may
contain a variety of terms which I will have accepted if I do not, at expense and
inconvenience, return the product. High-street merchants, whose goodwill in the
community may be influenced by how they treat me, may be more constrained in
what they do to me than will distant vendors enabled by technology. There is irony
in the fact that a leading United States decision dealing with these issues grew out
of the purchase of a computer.
IT has certainly entered the field. I have prepared my annual income tax forms
for several years using different ones of competing tax preparation software. In a
recently received (unsolicited) catalogue, I had the opportunity to purchase Quicken
Family Lawyer '994' or the American Bar Association Family Legal Guide (both on
CD-ROM) and was referred to www.itslegal.com where, I was told, I could prepare
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my own legal documents ("prices range from FREE to $11.95")." The develop-
ment of expert systems of this kind is affecting the manner in and extent to which
law firms employ and supervise paralegals in handling routine matters. IT will also
embolden new unqualified entrepreneurs to offer legal services for transactions
where lawyers' fees are out of proportion to the parties' resources or the stakes in the
transaction. When it is worthwhile to invest in a lawyer's services, rather than doing
it yourself, will continue to be a question which individuals face, initially, alone.
In the competition between qualified lawyers and others, law firms have also
begun to provide legal information on-line, as Susskind predicts they will. For most,
so far, this amounts only to publishing on web pages, or perhaps sending by e-mail,
the kinds of documents previously, and no doubt still, provided clients in print, but
Clifford Chance and Linklaters are reported to be providing interactive on-line legal
services, for an annual fee." It is too early to know whether such ventures will
succeed in becoming significant profit centers for firms or will serve a predominately
marketing function for firms' "traditional" services." In any case, it would be an
error to think that culture will be malleable and that limitations on use of IT will be
only technological. IT's tendency to penetrate and blur boundaries will be resisted,
since individuals and organizations require boundaries for effective management, for
accountability, and for security.
The division of legal work into "traditional" (case-by-case advice),
"commoditized" (routine processing of standardized problems), and "latent" (DIY,
as I term it) markets that Susskind describes as the law's future" is the legal
marketplace I have always known. IT and other factors are affecting boundaries and
structures, but these are variations on familiar themes. In my view, legal markets are
diversifying in subtle ways and in many more dimensions than this. Even the
"high-end" commercial law firms in my study are urgently seeking to conceive
diverse niches in which they can thrive in the future.
New paradigms are difficult to predict, and basing predictions on the continu-
ation of existing trends is hazardous. For Susskind, the maturity of IT seems to mark
the end of history." On the contrary, in my view, technology will continue to
develop, in information technology and in other areas. Whether the next dramatic
changes that will affect the shape of legal practice will be in information technology
is something we do not know.
IT constrains legal practice, and as those constraints change, new possibilities
for doing business arise, but it is not proven, at least to me, that IT is most central
to shaping the legal profession's future.48 Evolving economic orders, the evolution of
states, international communities, and public and private institutions, and shifting
boundaries between professional disciplines are the issues that concern the law firms
in my study. I would not predict the next paradigmatic shift in legal practice, but I
would guess that multidisciplinary partnerships and shifting centers of, and perhaps
decreasing, regulatory control are likely to be at least as salient as IT.
No doubt better algorithms for retrieving information will be developed. No
doubt more and better expert systems will be developed for matters susceptible to
them. Perhaps the law will be applied more to prevent loss, and this would be very
desirable. Certainly, there will be continuing restructuring of the profession and its
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work. I believe these developments will, in many respects, be beneficial in ways
Susskind demonstrates in aspects of his book I unfairly neglect in this essay. But
legal practice in the future will continue to be a mixture of facilitation, reparation,
and salvage, and clients will continue to need and to benefit from lawyers' advice.
In home improvement and repair, DIY is a successful industry. It is also the
stuff of comedy. When I think of Basil Fawlty and DIY, for me the occasion of
considerable laughter, procrastination, on-the-cheap, and hubris are traits that come
to mind. In real life, these phenomena produce frustration, chagrin, and expense at
best and real tragedy at worst. Those choosing to do-it-yourself, in law as well as
home improvement, lack expertise and other resources, but most of all they lack the
independent judgment that may be required to view their own situations with good
sense. If lawyers who represent themselves have fools for clients, laymen are multiply
disadvantaged. Of course, DIY is often "chosen" because individuals' resources are
inadequate to retain experts.
DIY in law will work best for the existing rather than the latent legal market.
Parties with experience and resources are in the best position to choose between
DIY and independent legal service and to make productive and safe use of available
legal information. Firms with in-house lawyers will benefit most. Inexperienced
individuals will be seriously disadvantaged. Perhaps in 2084 there will be a "big
brother computer" tracking all we do to alert us when we need a lawyer (and giving
us permission to see one?), saving us from unwise DIY law. Until then, I fear
reliance on Susskind's paradigm as a basis for policy is likely to widen rather than
narrow the gap between legal haves and have nots. The Government's vision in
Modernising Justice49 of a legal aid service administered through advice centers and
specialist law firms under contract, supported by IT, may be a constructive ap-
proach. But those without resources will be more likely to have their legal problems
treated in routine ways where they would benefit from creativity and judgment. The
danger is that a myth of IT could enable us to believe this is not the case or that it
does not matter.
